Abstract. qDSA is a high-speed, high-security signature scheme that facilitates implementations with a very small memory footprint, a crucial requirement for embedded systems and IoT devices, and that uses the same public keys as modern Diffie-Hellman schemes based on Montgomery curves (such as Curve25519) or Kummer surfaces. qDSA resembles an adaptation of EdDSA to the world of Kummer varieties, which are quotients of algebraic groups by ±1. Interestingly, qDSA does not require any full group operations or point recovery: all computations, including signature verification, occur on the quotient where there is no group law. We include details on four implementations of qDSA, using Montgomery and fast Kummer surface arithmetic on the 8-bit AVR ATmega and 32-bit ARM Cortex M0 platforms. We find that qDSA significantly outperforms state-of-the-art signature implementations in terms of stack usage and code size. We also include an efficient compression algorithm for points on fast Kummer surfaces, reducing them to the same size as compressed elliptic curve points for the same security level.
on the Jacobian based on the fast Kummer arithmetic [14, 35] . This avoids the need for a separate scalar multiplication on the Jacobian, but does not avoid the need for its group law; it also introduces the need for projecting to and recovering from the Kummer. In any case, it does not solve the problem of having different public key types.
Another proposal is XEdDSA [36] , which uses the public key on the Kummer variety to construct EdDSA signatures. In essence, it creates a key pair on the Jacobian by appending a sign bit to the public key on the Kummer variety, which can then be used for signatures.
In [23] Hamburg shows that one can actually verify signatures using only the x-coordinates of points on an elliptic curve, which is applied in the recent STROBE framework [24] . We generalize this approach to allow Kummer varieties of curves of higher genera, and naturally adapt the scheme by only allowing challenges up to sign. This allows us to provide a proof of security, which has thus far not been attempted (in [23] Hamburg remarks that verifying up to sign does "probably not impact security at all"). Similar techniques have been applied for batch verification of ECDSA signatures [28] , using the theory of summation polynomials [41] .
In this paper we show that there is no intrinsic reason why Kummer varieties cannot be used for signatures. We present qDSA, a signature scheme relying only on Kummer arithmetic, and prove it secure in the random oracle model. It should not be surprising that the reduction in our proof is slightly weaker than the standard proof of security of Schnorr signatures [37] , but not by more than we should expect. There is no difference between public keys for qDSA and Diffie-Hellman. After an abstract presentation in §2, we give a detailed description of ellipticcurve qDSA instances in §3. We then move on to genus-2 instances based on fast Kummer surfaces, which give better performance. The necessary arithmetic appears in §4, before §5 describes the new verification algorithm.
We also provide an efficient compression method for points on fast Kummer surfaces in §6, solving a long-standing open problem [6] . Our technique means that qDSA public keys for g = 2 can be efficiently compressed to 32 bytes, and that qDSA signatures fit into 64 bytes; it also finally reduces the size of Kummer-based Diffie-Hellman public keys from 48 to 32 bytes.
Finally, we provide constant-time software implementations of genus-1 and genus-2 qDSA instances for the AVR ATmega and ARM Cortex M0 platforms. The performance of all four qDSA implementations, reported in §7, comfortably beats earlier implementations in terms of stack usage and code size.
Source code. We place all of the software described here into the public domain, to maximize the reusability of our results. The software is available at http://www.cs.ru.nl/~jrenes/.
2 The qDSA signature scheme
In this section we define qDSA, the quotient Digital Signature Algorithm. We start by recalling the basics of Kummer varieties in §2.1 and defining key operations in §2.2. The rest of the section is dedicated to the definition of the qDSA signature scheme, which is presented in full in Algorithm 1, and its proof of security, which follows Pointcheval and Stern [37, 38] . qDSA closely resembles the Schnorr signature scheme [40] , as it results from applying the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [19] to an altered Schnorr identification protocol, together with a few standard changes as in EdDSA [8] . We comment on some special properties of qDSA in §2. 5 . Throughout, we work over finite fields F p with p > 3. Our low-level algorithms include costs in terms of basic F p -operations: M, S, C, a, s, I, and E denote the unit costs of computing a single multiplication, squaring, multiplication by a small constant, addition, subtraction, inverse, and square root, respectively.
The Kummer variety setting
Let C be a (hyper)elliptic curve and J its Jacobian 3 . The Jacobian is a commutative algebraic group with group operation +, inverse −, and identity 0. We assume J has a subgroup of large prime order N . The associated Kummer variety K is the quotient K = J /±. By definition, working with K corresponds to working on J up to sign. If P is an element of J , we denote its image in K by ±P . In this paper we take log 2 N ≈ 256, and consider two important cases.
Genus 1.
Here J = C/F p is an elliptic curve with log 2 p ≈ 256, while K = P 1 is the x-line.
We choose C to be Curve25519 [5] , which is the topic of §3. Genus 2. Here J is the Jacobian of a genus-2 curve C/F p , where log 2 p ≈ 128, and K is a Kummer surface. We use the Gaudry-Schost parameters [22] for our implementations. Kummer arithmetic, including some new constructions we need for signature verification and compression, is described in §4-6.
A point ±P in K(F p ) is the image of a pair of points {P, −P } on J . It is important to note that P and −P are not necessarily in J (F p ); if not, then they are conjugate points in J (F p 2 ), and correspond to points in J ′ (F p ), where J ′ is the quadratic twist of J . Both J and J ′ always have the same Kummer variety; we return to this fact, and its implications for our scheme, in §2.5 below.
Basic operations
While a Kummer variety K has no group law, the operation {±P, ±Q} → {±(P + Q), ±(P − Q)}
is well-defined. We can therefore define a pseudo-addition operation by xADD : (±P, ±Q, ±(P − Q)) → ±(P + Q).
The special case where ±(P − Q) = ±0 is the pseudo-doubling xDBL : ±P → ± [2] P . In our applications we can often improve efficiency by combining two of these operations in a single function xDBLADD : (±P, ±Q, ±(P − Q)) −→ (±[2]P, ±(P + Q)) .
For any integer m, the scalar multiplication [m] on J induces the key cryptographic operation of pseudomultiplication on K, defined by Ladder : (m, ±P ) −→ ±[m]P .
As its name suggests, we compute Ladder using Montgomery's famous ladder algorithm [32] , which is a uniform sequence of xDBLADDs and constant-time conditional swaps. 4 This constanttime nature will be important for signing.
Our signature verification requires a function Check on K 3 defined by
Since we are working with projective points, we need a way to uniquely represent them. Moreover, we want this representation to be as small as possible, to minimize communication overhead. For this purpose we define the functions
writing ±P := Compress(±P ), and
For the remainder of this section we assume that Ladder, Check, Compress, and Decompress are defined. Their implementation depends on whether we are in the genus 1 or 2 setting; we return to this in later sections.
The qID identification protocol
Let P be a generator of a prime order subgroup of J , of order N , and let ±P be its image in K. Let Z + N denote the subset of Z N with zero least significant bit (where we identify elements of Z N with their representatives in [0, N − 1]). Note that since N is odd, LSB(−x) = 1− LSB(x) for all x ∈ Z * N . The private key is an element d ∈ Z N . Let Q = [d]P and let the public key be ±Q. Now consider the following Schnorr-style identification protocol, which we call qID:
(1) The prover sets r ← R Z * N , ±R ← ±[r]P and sends ±R to the verifier; (2) The verifier sets c ← R Z + N and sends c to the prover; (3) The prover sets s ← (r − cd) mod N and sends s to the verifier; (4) The verifier accepts if and only if ±R ∈ {±(
There are some important differences between qID and the basic Schnorr identification protocol in [40] .
Scalar multiplications on K. It is well-known that one can use K to perform the scalar multiplication [14, 35] within a Schnorr identification or signature scheme, but with this approach one must always lift back to an element of a group. In contrast, in our scheme this recovery step is not necessary. Verification on K. The original verification [40] . A Schnorr protocol using the weaker verification above would not satisfy the special soundness property: the transcripts (±R, c, s) and (±R, −c, s) are both valid, and do not allow us to extract a witness. Choosing c from Z + N instead of Z eliminates this possibility, and allows a security proof (this is the main difference with Hamburg's STROBE [24] ). Proposition 1. The qID identification protocol is a sigma protocol.
Proof. We prove the required properties (see [25, §6] ).
Completeness: If the protocol is followed, then r = s+cd, and therefore
Special soundness: Let (±R, c 0 , s 0 ) and (±R, c 1 , s 1 ) be two valid transcripts such that 
be the distributions of honest and simulated signatures, respectively. The elements of δ and δ ′ are the same. First, consider δ. There are exactly N − 1 choices for r, and exactly (N + 1)/2 for c; all of them lead to distinct tuples. There are thus (N 2 − 1)/2 possible tuples, all of which have probability 2/(N 2 − 1) of occurring. Now consider δ ′ . Again, there are (N + 1)/2 choices for c. We have N choices for s, exactly one of which leads to R = O. Thus, given c, there are N − 1 choices for s. We conclude that δ ′ also contains (N 2 − 1)/2 possible tuples, which all have probability 2/(N 2 − 1) of occurring. ⊓ ⊔
Applying Fiat-Shamir
Applying the Fiat-Shamir transform [19] to qID yields a signature scheme qSIG. We will need a hash function H : {0, 1} * → Z + N , which we define by taking a hash function H : {0, 1} * → Z N and then setting H by
The qSIG signature scheme is defined as follows:
(1) To sign a message M ∈ {0, 1} * with private key d ∈ Z N and public key ±Q ∈ K, the prover sets r ← R Z * N , ±R ← ±[r]R, h ← H(±R || M ), and s ← (r − hd) mod N , and sends (±R || s) to the verifier. (2) To verify a signature (±R || s) ∈ K × Z N on a message M ∈ {0, 1} * with public key ±Q ∈ K, the verifier sets h ← H(±R || M ), ±T 0 ← ±[s]P , and ±T 1 ← ±[h]Q, and accepts if and only if ±R ∈ {±(T 0 + T 1 ), ±(T 0 − T 1 )}.
Proposition 2 asserts that the security properties of qID carry over to qSIG.
Proposition 2.
In the random oracle model, if an existential forgery of the qSIG signature scheme under an adaptive chosen message attack has non-negligible probability of success, then the DLP in J can be solved in polynomial time.
Proof. This is the standard proof of applying the Fiat-Shamir transform to a sigma protocol: see [37, Theorem 13] or [38, §3.2] . ⊓ ⊔ 5 As we only know Q up to sign, we may need two attempts to construct S.
The qDSA signature scheme
Moving towards the real world, we slightly alter the qSIG protocol with some pragmatic choices, following Bernstein et al. [8] :
(1) We replace the randomness r by the output of a pseudo-random function, which makes the signatures deterministic. (2) We include the public key ±Q in the generation of the challenge, to prevent attackers from attacking multiple public keys at the same time. (3) We compress and decompress points on K where necessary.
The resulting signature scheme, qDSA, is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Unified keys. Signatures are entirely computed and verified on K, which is also the natural setting for Diffie-Hellman key exchange. We can therefore use identical key pairs for Diffie-Hellman and for qDSA signatures. This significantly simplifies the implementation of cryptographic libraries, as we no longer need arithmetic for the two distinct objects J and K. Technically, there is no reason not to use a single key pair for both key exchange and signing; but one should be very careful in doing so, as using one key across multiple protocols could potentially lead to attacks. The primary interest of this aspect of qDSA is not necessarily in reducing the number of keys, but in unifying key formats and reducing the size of the trusted code base.
Security level. The security reduction to the discrete logarithm problem is almost identical to the case of Schnorr signatures [37] . Notably, the challenge space has about half the size (Z + N versus Z N ) while the proof of soundness computes either s 0 + s 1 or s 0 − s 1 . This results in a slightly weaker reduction, as should be expected by moving from J to K and by weakening verification. By choosing log 2 N ≈ 256 we obtain a scheme with about the same security level as state-of-the-art schemes (eg. EdDSA combined with Ed25519). This could be made more precise (cf. [38] ), but we do not provide this analysis here.
Key and signature sizes. Public keys fit into 32 bytes in both the genus 1 and genus 2 settings. This is standard for Montgomery curves; for Kummer surfaces it requires a new compression technique, which we present in §6. In both cases log 2 N < 256, which means that signatures (±R || s) fit in 64 bytes.
Twist security. Rational points on K correspond to pairs of points on either J or its quadratic twist. As opposed to Diffie-Hellman, in qDSA scalar multiplications with secret scalars are only performed on the public parameter ±P , which is chosen as the image of large prime order element of J . Therefore J is not technically required to have a secure twist, unlike in the modern Diffie-Hellman setting. But if K is also used for key exchange (which is the whole point!), then twist security is crucial. We therefore strongly recommend twist-secure parameters for qDSA implementations.
Hash function. The function H can be any hash function with at least a log 2 √ N -bit security level and at least 2 log 2 N -bit output. Throughout this paper we take H to be the extendable output function SHAKE128 [18] 
Signature compression. Schnorr mentions in [40] that signatures (R || s) may be compressed to (H(R || Q || M ) || s), taking only the first 128 bits of the hash, thus reducing signature size from 64 to 48 bytes. This is possible because we can recompute R from P , Q, s, and H(R || Q || M ). However, on K we cannot recover ±R from ±P , ±Q, s, and H(±R || ±Q || M ), so Schnorr's compression technique is not an option for us.
Batching. Proposals for batch signature verification typically rely on the group structure, verifying random linear combinations of points [8, 33] . Since K has no group structure, these batching algorithms are not possible. 3 Implementing qDSA with elliptic curves
Our first concrete instantiation of qDSA uses the Kummer variety of an elliptic curve, which is just the x-line P 1 .
Montgomery curves
Consider the elliptic curve in Montgomery form
where A 2 = 4 and B = 0. The map E AB → K = P 1 defined by
gives rise to efficient x-only arithmetic on P 1 (see [32] ). We use the Ladder specified in [17, Alg. 1]. Compression uses Bernstein's map
while decompression is the near-trivial
Note that Decompress never returns ⊥, and that Decompress(Compress((X : Z))) = (X : Z) whenever Z = 0 (however, the points (0 : 1) and (1 : 0) should never appear as public keys or signatures).
Signature verification
It remains to define the Check operation for Montgomery curves. In the final step of verification we are given ±R, ±P , and ±Q in P 1 , and we need to check whether ±R ∈ {±(P + Q), ±(P − Q)}. Proposition 3 reduces this to checking a quadratic relation in the coordinates of ±R, ±P , and ±Q.
Proposition 3. Writing (X P : Z P ) = ±P for P in E AB , etc.: If P , Q, and R are points on E AB , then ±R ∈ ±(P + Q), ±(P − Q) if and only if
where
If we temporarily assume ±0 = ±P = ±Q = ±0 and put x P = X P /Z P , etc., then the group law on E AB gives us
Homogenizing, we obtain
One readily verifies that Equation (6) still holds even when the temporary assumption does not (that is, when ±P = ±Q or ±P = ±0 or ±Q = ±0). Having degree 2, the homogeneous polynomial B ZZ X 2 − B XZ XZ + B XX Z 2 cuts out two points in P 1 (which may coincide); by Equation (6), they are ±(P + Q) and ±(P − Q), so if (X R : Z R ) satisfies Equation (2) then it must be one of them. ⊓ ⊔ Algorithm 2: Checking the verification relation for P 1
else return False
Cost: 6M + 2S + 1C + 7a + 3s // See Algorithm 8 and Proposition 3
Using cryptographic parameters
We use the elliptic curve E/F p : y 2 = x 3 + 486662x 2 + x where p = 2 255 − 19, which is commonly referred to as Curve25519 [5] . Let P ∈ E(F p ) be such that ±P = (9 : 1). Then P has order 8N , where
is prime. The xDBLADD operation requires us to store (A + 2)/4 = 121666, and we implement optimized multiplication by this constant. In [5, §3] Bernstein sets and clears some bits of the private key, also referred to as "clamping". This is not necessary in qDSA, but we do it anyway in keypair for compatibility.
Implementing qDSA with Kummer surfaces
A number of cryptographic protocols that have been successfully implemented with Montgomery curves have seen substantial practical improvements when the curves are replaced with Kummer surfaces. From a general point of view, a Kummer surface is the quotient of some genus-2 Jacobian J by ±1; geometrically it is a surface in P 3 with sixteen point singularities, called nodes, which are the images in K of the 2-torsion points of J (since these are precisely the points fixed by −1). From a cryptographic point of view, a Kummer surface is just a 2-dimensional analogue of the x-coordinate used in Montgomery curve arithmetic. The algorithmic and software aspects of efficient Kummer surface arithmetic have already been covered in great detail elsewhere (see eg. [21] , [7] , and [39] ). Indeed, the Kummer scalar multiplication algorithms and software that we use in our signature implementation are identical to those described in [39] , and use the cryptographic parameters proposed by Gaudry and Schost [22] .
This work includes two entirely new Kummer algorithms that are essential for our signature scheme: verification relation testing (Check, Algorithm 3) and compression/decompression (Compress and Decompress, Algorithms 4 and 5). Both of these new techniques require a fair amount of technical development, which we begin in this section by recalling the basic Kummer equation and constants, and deconstructing the pseudo-doubling operation into a sequence of surfaces and maps that will play important roles later. Once the scene has been set, we will describe our signature verification algorithm in §5 and our point compression scheme in §6. The reader primarily interested in the resulting performance improvements may wish to skip directly to §7 on first reading.
The Check, Compress, and Decompress algorithms defined below require the following subroutines:
-Mul4 implements a 4-way parallel multiplication. It takes a pair of vectors (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 ) and (y 1 , y 2 , y 3 , y 4 ) in F 4 p , and returns (x 1 y 1 , x 2 y 2 , x 3 y 3 , x 4 y 4 ). -Sqr4 implements a 4-way parallel squaring. Given a vector (
-Dot computes the sum of a 4-way multiplication. Given a pair of vectors (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 ) and (y 1 , y 2 , y 3 , y 4 ) in F 4 p , it returns x 1 y 1 + x 2 y 2 + x 3 y 3 + x 4 y 4 .
Constants
Our Kummer surfaces are defined by four fundamental constants α 1 , α 2 , α 3 , α 4 and four dual constants α 1 , α 2 , α 3 , and α 4 , which are related by
We require all of the α i and α i to be nonzero. The fundamental constants determine the dual constants up to sign, and vice versa. These relations remain true when we exchange the α i with the α i ; we call this "swapping x with x" operation "dualizing". To make the symmetry in what follows clear, we define
along with their respective duals µ i , ǫ i , and κ i . Note that
and
There are many clashing notational conventions for theta constants in the cryptographic Kummer literature; Table 1 provides a dictionary for converting between them. Our applications use only the squared constants µ i and µ i , so only they need be in F p . In practice we want them to be as "small" as possible, both to reduce the cost of multiplying by them and to reduce the cost of storing them. In fact, it follows from their definition that it is much easier to find simultaneously small µ i and µ i than it is to find simultaneously small α i and α i (or a mixture of the two); this is ultimately why we prefer the squared surface for scalar multiplication. We note that if the µ i are very small, then the ǫ i and κ i are also small, and the same goes for their duals. While we will never actually compute with the unsquared constants, we need them to explain what is happening in the background below.
Finally, the Kummer surface equations involve some derived constants
,
and their duals E, F , G, H. We observe that
Source Fundamental constants Dual constants [21] and [7] (a : Table 1 . Relations between our theta constants and others in selected related work
Fast Kummer surfaces
We compute all of the pseudoscalar multiplications in qDSA on the so-called squared Kummer surface
which was proposed for factorization algorithms by the Chudnovskys [13] , then later for DiffieHellman by Bernstein [6] . Since E only appears as a square, K Sqr is defined over F p . The zero point on K Sqr is ±0 = (µ 1 : µ 2 : µ 3 : µ 4 ). In our implementations we used the xDBLADD and Montgomery ladder exactly as they were presented in [39, (see also Algorithm 9). The pseudo-doubling xDBL on K Sqr is
for ±P with all X P i = 0; more complicated formulae exist for other ±P (cf. §5.1). Figure 1 deconstructs the pseudo-doubling on K Sqr from §4.2 into a cycle of atomic maps between different Kummer surfaces, which form a sort of hexagon. Starting at any one of the Kummers and doing a complete cycle of these maps carries out pseudo-doubling on that Kummer. Doing a half-cycle from a given Kummer around to its dual computes a (2, 2)-isogeny splitting pseudo-doubling. Six different Kummer surfaces may seem like a lot to keep track of-even if there are really only three, together with their duals. However, the new surfaces are important, because they are crucial in deriving our Check routine (of course, once the algorithm has been written down, the reader is free to forget about the existence of these other surfaces).
Deconstructing pseudo-doubling
The cycle actually begins one step before K Sqr , with the canonical surface This was the model proposed for cryptographic applications by Gaudry in [21] ; we call it "canonical" because it is the model arising from a canonical basis of theta functions of level (2, 2).
Now we can begin our tour around the hexagon, moving from K Can to K Sqr via the squaring map
which corresponds to a (2, 2)-isogeny of Jacobians. Moving on from K Sqr , the Hadamard transform isomorphism
takes us into a third kind of Kummer, which we call the intermediate surface:
We will use K Int for signature verification. Now the dual scaling isomorphism
takes us into the dual canonical surface
We are now halfway around the hexagon; the return journey is simply the dual of the outbound trip. The dual squaring map
another (2, 2)-isogeny, carries us into the dual squared surface
takes us into the dual intermediate surface
A final scaling isomorphism
takes us from K Int back to K Can , where we started. The canonical surfaces K Can resp. K Can are only defined over
, while the scaling isomorphisms C resp. C are defined over F p ( α 1 , α 2 , α 3 , α 4 ) resp. F p (α 1 , α 2 , α 3 , α 4 ). Everything else is defined over F p .
We confirm that one cycle around the hexagon, starting and ending on K Sqr , computes the pseudo-doubling of Equations (7), (8) , (9) , and (10). Similarly, one cycle around the hexagon starting and ending on K Can computes Gaudry's pseudo-doubling from [21, §3.2].
Signature verification on Kummer surfaces
To verify signatures in the Kummer surface implementation, we need to supply a Check algorithm which, given ±P , ±Q, and ±R on K Sqr , decides whether ±R ∈ {±(P + Q), ±(P − Q)}. For the elliptic version of qDSA described in §3, we saw that this came down to checking that ±R satisfied one quadratic relation whose three coefficients were biquadratic forms in ±P and ±Q. The same principle extends to Kummer surfaces, where the pseudo-group law is similarly defined by biquadratic forms; but since Kummer surfaces are defined in terms of four coordinates (as opposed to the two coordinates of the x-line), this time there are six simple quadratic relations to verify, with a total of ten coefficient forms.
Biquadratic forms and pseudo-addition
Let K be a Kummer surface. If ±P is a point on K, then we write (Z P 1 : Z P 2 : Z P 3 : Z P 4 ) for its projective coordinates. The classical theory of abelian varieties tells us that there exist biquadratic forms B ij for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 4 such that for all ±P and ±Q, if ±S = ±(P + Q) and ±D = ±(P − Q) then (11) where λ ∈ k × is some common projective factor depending only on the affine representatives chosen for ±P , ±Q, ±(P + Q) and ±(P − Q). These biquadratic forms are the foundation of pseudo-addition and doubling laws on K: if the "difference" ±D is known, then we can use the B ij to compute ±S. Proposition 4. Let {B ij : 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 4} be a set of biquadratic forms on K × K satisfying Equation (11) for all ±P , ±Q, ±(P + Q), and ±(P − Q). Then
Proof. Looking at Equation (11), we see that the system of six quadratics from Equation (12) cuts out a zero-dimensional degree-2 subscheme of K: that is, the pair of points {±(P + Q), ±(P − Q)} (which may coincide). Hence, if
= ±R satisfies all of the equations, then it must be one of them.
⊓ ⊔
Deriving efficiently computable forms
Proposition 4 is the exact analogue of Proposition 3 for Kummer surfaces. All that we need to turn it into a Check algorithm for qDSA is an explicit and efficiently computable representation of the B ij . These forms depend on the projective model of the Kummer surface; so we write B Can ij , B 
while the off-diagonal forms B ij with i = j are
where {i, j, k, l} = {1, 2, 3, 4}.
All of these forms can be efficiently evaluated. We could avoid this difficulty by mapping the inputs of Check from K Sqr into K Can , and then evaluating the B Can ij . But this would involve using-and, therefore, storing-the four large unsquared α i , which is an important drawback.
Why do the nice B Can ij become so ugly when pulled back to K Sqr ? The map C : K Int → K Can has no impact on the shape or number of monomials, so most of the ugliness is due to the Hadamard transform H : K Sqr → K Int . In particular, if we only pull back the B Can ij as far as K Int , then the resulting B Int ij retain the nice form of the B Can ij but do not involve the α i . This fact prompts our solution: we map ±P , ±Q, and ±R through H onto K Int , and verify using the forms B Int ij .
Theorem 1.
Up to a common projective factor, the on-diagonal biquadratic forms on the intermediate surface
Up to the same common projective factor, the off-diagonal forms are (20) for {i, j, k, l} = {1, 2, 3, 4} where
.
Proof. By definition, T
Dualizing the B Can ij from Equations (13), (14) , and (15), we find
for {i, j, k, l} = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Multiplying all of these forms by a common projective factor of 4(µ 1 µ 2 µ 3 µ 4 )( µ 1 µ 2 µ 3 µ 4 ) 2 eliminates the denominators in the coefficients, and yields the forms of the theorem. ⊓ ⊔
Signature verification
We are now finally ready to implement the Check algorithm for K Sqr . Algorithm 3 does this by applying H to its inputs, then using the biquadratic forms of Theorem 1. Its correctness is implied by Proposition 4.
Using cryptographic parameters
Gaudry and Schost take p = 2 127 − 1 and (µ 1 : µ 2 : µ 3 : µ 4 ) = (−11 : 22 : 19 : 3) in [22] . We also need the constants ( µ 1 : µ 2 : µ 3 : µ 4 ) = (−33 : 11 : 17 : 49), (κ 1 : κ 2 : κ 3 : κ 4 ) = (−4697 : 5951 : 5753 : −1991), and ( ǫ 1 : ǫ 2 : ǫ 3 : ǫ 4 ) = (−833 : 2499 : 1617 : 561). 7 In practice, where these constants are "negative", we reverse their sign and amend the formulae above accordingly. All of these constants are small, and fit into one or two bytes each (and the ǫ i are already stored for use in Ladder). We store one large constant
and recompute the C ij on the fly. 7 Following the definitions of §4.1, the µi are scaled by −2, the ǫi by 1/11, and C by 2/11 2 . These changes influence the B Int ij , but only up to the same projective factor. Algorithm 3: Checking the verification relation for points on K Sqr
True if ±R ∈ {±(P + Q), ±(P − Q)}, False otherwise Cost: 76M + 8S + 88C + 42a + 42s 
Kummer point compression
Our public keys are points on K Sqr , and each signature includes one point on K Sqr . Minimizing the space required by Kummer points is therefore essential.
A projective Kummer point is composed of four field elements; normalizing by dividing through by a nonzero coordinate reduces us to three field elements (this can also be achieved using Bernstein's "wrapping" technique [6] , as in [7] and [39] ). But we are talking about Kummer surfaces-two-dimensional objects-so we might hope to compress to two field elements, plus a few bits to enable us to correctly recover the whole Kummer point. This is analogous to elliptic curve point compression, where we compress projective points (X : Y : Z) by normalizing to (x, y) = (X/Z, Y /Z), then storing (x, σ), where σ is a bit indicating the "sign" of y. Decompressing the datum (x, σ) to (X : Y : Z) = (x : y : 1) then requires solving a simple quadratic to recover the correct y-coordinate.
For some reason, no such Kummer point compression method has explicitly appeared in the literature. Bernstein remarked in 2006 that if we compress a Kummer point to two co-ordinates, then decompression appears to require solving a complicated quartic equation [6] . This would be much more expensive than computing the single square root required for elliptic decompression; this has perhaps discouraged implementers from attempting to compress Kummer points.
But while it may not always be obvious from their defining equations, the classical theory tells us that every Kummer is in fact a double cover of P 2 , just as elliptic curves are double covers of P 1 . We use this principle below to show that we can always compress any Kummer point to two field elements plus two auxiliary bits, and then decompress by solving a quadratic. In our applications, this gives us a convenient packaging of Kummer points in exactly 256 bits.
The general principle
First, we sketch a general method for Kummer point compression that works for any Kummer presented as a singular quartic surface in P 3 .
Recall that if N is any point in P 3 , then projection away from N defines a map π N : P 3 → P 2 sending points in P 3 on the same line through N to the same point in P 2 . (The map π N is only a rational map, and not a morphism; the image of N itself is not well-defined.) Now, let N be a node of a Kummer surface K: that is, N is one of the 16 singular points of K. The restriction of π N to K forms a double cover of P 2 . By definition, π N maps the points on K that lie on the same line through N to the same point of P 2 . Now K has degree 4, so each line in P 3 intersects K in four points; but since N is a double point of K, every line through N intersects K at N twice, and then in two other points. These two remaining points may be "compressed" to their common image in P 2 under π N , plus a single bit to distinguish the appropriate preimage.
To make this more concrete, let L 1 , L 2 , and L 3 be linearly independent linear forms on P 3 vanishing on N ; then N is the intersection of the three planes in P 3 cut out by the L i . We can now realise the projection π N : K → P 2 as
with another basis of L 1 , L 2 , L 3 yields another projection, which corresponds to composing π N with a linear automorphism of P 2 .
If L 1 , L 2 , and L 3 are chosen as above to vanish on N , and L 4 is any linear form not in
where each K i is a homogeneous polynomial of degree i in L 1 , L 2 , and L 3 . This form, quadratic in L 4 , allows us to replace the L 4 -coordinate with a single bit indicating the "sign" in the corresponding root of this quadratic; the remaining three coordinates can be normalized to an affine plane point. The net result is a compression to two field elements, plus one bit indicating the normalization, plus another bit to indicate the correct value of L 4 . Remark 1. Stahlke gives a compression algorithm in [42] for points on genus-2 Jacobians in the usual Mumford representation. The first step can be seen as a projection to the most general model of the Kummer (as in [12, Chapter 3] ), and then the second is an implicit implementation of the principle above.
From squared Kummers to tetragonal Kummers
We want to define an efficient point compression scheme for K Sqr . The general principle above makes this possible, but it leaves open the choice of node N and the choice of forms L i . These choices determine the complexity of the resulting K i , and hence the cost of evaluating them; this in turn has a non-negligible impact on the time and space required to compress and decompress points, as well as the number of new auxiliary constants that must be stored.
In this section we define a choice of L i reflecting the special symmetry of K Sqr . A similar procedure for K Can appears in more classical language 8 in [26, §54] . The trick is to distinguish not one node of K Sqr , but rather the four nodes forming the kernel of the (2, 2)-isogeny
We are going to define a coordinate system where these four nodes become the vertices of a coordinate tetrahedron; then, projection onto any three of the four coordinates will represent a projection away from one of these four nodes. The result will be an isomorphic Kummer K Tet whose defining equation is quadratic in all four of its variables. This might seem like overkill for point compression-quadratic in just one variable would suffice-but it has the agreeable effect of dramatically reducing the overall complexity of the defining equation, saving time and memory in our compression and decompression algorithms. The key is the matrix identity
which tells us that the projective isomorphism T : P 3 → P 3 defined by
maps the four "kernel" nodes to the corners of a coordinate tetrahedron: 8 The analogous model of K Can in [26, §54] is called "the equation referred to a Rosenhain tetrad", whose defining equation "...may be deduced from the fact that Kummer's surface is the focal surface of the congruence of rays common to a tetrahedral complex and a linear complex." Modern cryptographers will understand why we have chosen to give a little more algebraic detail here.
The image of K Sqr under T is the tetragonal surface
where t = 16µ 1 µ 2 µ 3 µ 4 µ 1 µ 2 µ 3 µ 4 and
As promised, the defining equation of K Tet is quadratic in all four of its variables. For compression we project away from T (±0) = (0 : 0 :
, because each K i is nonconstant and homogeneous. Conversely, if (k 2 , k 3 , k 4 ) = 0 and (l 1 , l 2 , l 3 ) = 0 then we could embed a line in K Tet via λ → (l 1 : l 2 : l 3 : λ); but this is a contradiction, because K Tet contains no lines. ⊓ ⊔
Compression and decompression for K Sqr
In practice, we compress points on K Sqr to tuples (l 1 , l 2 , τ, σ), where l 1 and l 2 are field elements and τ and σ are bits. The recipe is
Compute the unique (l 1 , l 2 , l 3 , l 4 ) in one of the forms ( * , * , 1, * ), ( * , 1, 0, * ), (1, 0, 0, * ), or (0, 0, 0, 1) such that (l 1 :
where q(X) = k 2 X 2 − 2k 3 X + k 4 ; and Lemma 1 tells us that q(X) is either quadratic, linear, or identically zero.
-If q is a nonsingular quadratic, then l 4 is determined by (l 1 , l 2 , l 3 ) and σ, because σ = Sign(R) where R is the correct square root in the quadratic formula If q is singular or linear, then (l 1 , l 2 , l 3 ) determines l 4 , and σ is redundant. -If q = 0 then (l 1 , l 2 , l 3 ) = (0, 0, 0), so l 4 = 1; again, σ is redundant. Setting σ = Sign(k 2 l 4 − k 3 ) in every case, regardless of whether or not we need it to determine l 4 , avoids ambiguity and simplifies code. (5) The normalization in Step 2 forces l 3 ∈ {0, 1}; so encode l 3 as a single bit τ .
The datum (l 1 , l 2 , τ, σ) completely determines (l 1 , l 2 , l 3 , l 4 ), and thus determines (X 1 : X 2 : X 3 : X 4 ) = T −1 ((l 1 : l 2 : l 2 : l 4 )). Conversely, the normalization in Step 2 ensures that (l 1 , l 2 , τ, σ) is uniquely determined by (X 1 : X 2 : X 3 : X 4 ), and is independent of the representative values of the X i .
Algorithm 4 carries out the compression process above; the most expensive step is the computation of an inverse in F p . Algorithm 5 is the corresponding decompression algorithm; its cost is dominated by computing a square root in F p .
Algorithm 4: Kummer point compression for
3 ) // Normalize to ( * : * : 1 : * )
2 ) // Normalize to ( * : 1 : 0 : * )
Proposition 5. Algorithms 4 and 5 (Compress and Decompress) satisfy the following properties: given (l 1 , l 2 , τ, σ) in F 2 p × {0, 1} 2 , Decompress always returns either a valid point in K Sqr (F p ) or ⊥; and for every ±P in K Sqr (F p ), we have Decompress(Compress(±P )) = ±P . Input: (l 1 , l 2 , τ, σ) with l 1 , l 2 ∈ F p and τ, σ ∈ {0, 1} Output: The point ±P in K Sqr (F p ) such that Compress(±P ) = (l 1 , l 2 , τ, σ), or ⊥ if no such ±P exists Cost: 10M + 9S + 18C + 13a + 8s + 1E
// Alg. 14,15,16
else if k 2 = 0 and k 3 = 0 then
Proof. In Algorithm 5 we are given (l 1 , l 2 , τ, σ). We can immediately set l 3 = τ , viewed as an element of F p . We want to compute an l 4 in F p , if it exists, such that k 2 l 2 4 − 2k 3 l 4 + k 4 = 0 and
If such an l 4 exists, then we will have a preimage (l 1 : l 2 : l 3 : l 4 ) in K Tet (F p ), and we can return the decompressed T −1 ((l 1 :
The only legitimate datum in this form is is (l 1 : l 2 : τ : σ) = (0 : 0 : 0 : Sign(0)). If this was the input, then the preimage is (0 : 0 : 0 : 1); otherwise we return ⊥.
If k 2 = 0 but k 3 = 0, then k 4 = 2k 3 l 4 , so (l 1 : l 2 : τ : l 4 ) = (2k 3 l 1 : 2k 3 l 2 : 2k 3 τ : k 4 ). The datum is a valid compression unless σ = Sign(−k 3 ), in which case we return ⊥; otherwise, the preimage is (2k 3 l 1 : 2k 3 l 2 : 2k 3 τ : k 4 ).
If k 2 = 0, then the quadratic formula tells us that any preimage satisfies k 2 l 4 = k 3 ± k 2 3 − k 2 k 4 , with the sign determined by Sign(
is not a square in F p then there is no such l 4 in F p ; the input is illegitimate, so we return ⊥. Otherwise, we have a preimage (k 2 l 1 :
Line 17 maps the preimage (l 1 :
Using cryptographic parameters
Our compression scheme works out particularly nicely for the Gaudry-Schost Kummer over F 2 127 −1 . First, since every field element fits into 127 bits, every compressed point fits into exactly 256 bits. Second, the auxiliary constants are small: we have ( κ 1 : κ 2 : κ 3 : κ 4 ) = (−961 : 128 : 569 : 1097), each of which fits into well under 16 bits. Computing the polynomials K 2 , K 3 , K 4 and dividing them all through by 11 2 (which does not change the roots of the quadratic) gives
where (q 0 , . . . , q 7 ) = (3575, 9625, 4625, 12259, 11275, 7475, 6009, 43991); each of the q i fits into 16 bits. In total, the twelve new constants we need for Compress and Decompress together fit into less than two field elements' worth of space.
Implementation
In this section we present the results of the implementation of the scheme on the AVR ATmega and ARM Cortex M0 platforms. We have a total of four implementations: on both platforms we implemented both the Curve25519-based scheme and the scheme based on a fast Kummer surface in genus 2. The benchmarks for the AVR software are obtained from the Arduino MEGA development board containing an ATmega2560 MCU, compiled with GCC v4.8.1. For the Cortex M0, they are measured on the STM32F051R8 MCU on the STMF0Discovery board, compiled with Clang v3.5.0. We refer to the (publicly available) code for more detailed compiler settings. For both Diffie-Hellman and signatures we follow the eBACS [4] API.
Core functionality
The arithmetic of the underlying finite fields is well-studied and optimized, and we do not reinvent the wheel. For field arithmetic in F 2 255 −19 we use the highly optimized functions presented by Hutter and Schwabe [27] for the AVR ATmega, and the code from Düll et al. [17] for the Cortex M0. For arithmetic in F 2 127 −1 we use the functions from Renes et al. [39] , which in turn rely on [27] for the AVR ATmega, and on [17] for the Cortex M0. The SHAKE128 functions for the ATmega are taken from [10] , while on the Cortex M0 we use a modified version from [2] . Cycle counts for the main functions defined in the rest of this paper are presented in Table 2 . Notably, the Ladder routine is by far the most expensive function. In genus 1 the Compress function is relatively costly (it is essentially an inversion), while in genus 2 Check, Compress and Decompress have only minor impact on the total runtime. More interestingly, as seen in Table 3 and Table 4 , the simplicity of operating only on the Kummer variety allows smaller code and less stack usage. Table 2 . Cycle counts for the four key functions of qDSA at the 128-bit security level.
Comparison to previous work
There are not many implementations of complete signature and key exchange schemes on microcontrollers. On the other hand, there are implementations of scalar multiplication on elliptic curves. The current fastest on our platforms are presented by Düll et al. [17] , and since we are relying on exactly the same arithmetic, we have essentially the same results. Similarly, the current records for scalar multiplication on Kummer surfaces are presented by Renes et al. [39] . Since we use the same underlying functions, we have similar results. More interestingly, we compare the speed and memory usage of signing and verification to best known results of implementations of complete signature schemes. To the best of our knowledge, the only other works are the Ed25519-based scheme by Nascimento et al [34] , the FourQ-based scheme (obtaining fast scalar multiplication by relying on easily computable endomorphisms) by Liu et al [30] , and the genus-2 implementation from [39] .
AVR ATmega. As we see in Table 3 , our implementation of the scheme based on Curve25519 outperforms the Ed25519-based scheme from [34] in every way. It reduces the number of clock cycles needed for sign resp. verify by more than 26% resp. 17%, while reducing stack usage by more than 65% resp. 47%. Code size is not reported in [34] . Comparing against the FourQ implementation of [30] , we see a clear trade-off between speed and size: FourQ has a clear speed advantage, but qDSA on Curve25519 requires only a fraction of the stack space.
The implementation based on the Kummer surface of the genus-2 Gaudry-Schost Jacobian does better than the Curve25519-based implementation across the board. Compared to [39] , the stack usage of sign resp. verify decreases by more than 54% resp. 38%, while decreasing code size by about 11%. On the other hand, verification is about 26% slower. This is explained by the fact that in [39] the signature is compressed to 48 bytes (following Schnorr's suggestion), which means that one of the scalar multiplications in verification is only half length. Comparing to the FourQ implementation of [30] , again we see a clear trade-off between speed and size, but this time the loss of speed is less pronounced than in the comparison with Curve25519-based qDSA.
ARM Cortex M0. In this case there is no elliptic-curve-based signature scheme to compare to, so we present the first. As we see in Table 4 , it is significantly slower than its genus-2 Table 3 . Performance comparison of the qDSA signature scheme against the current best implementations, on the AVR ATmega platform.
counterpart in this paper (as should be expected), while using a similar amount of stack and code. The genus-2 signature scheme has similar trade-offs on this platform when compared to the implementation by Renes et al. [39] . The stack usage for sign resp. verify is reduced by about 57% resp. 43%, while code size is reduced by about 8%. For the same reasons as above, verification is about 28% slower. 
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B Kummer surface implementation details
The algorithms in this section complete the description of Kummer qDSA in § §4-6. They follow our C reference implementation very closely. Recall that we have the following subroutines:
-Mul4 implements a 4-way parallel multiplication. It takes a pair of vectors (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 ) and (y 1 , y 2 , y 3 , y 4 ) in F 4 p , and returns (x 1 y 1 , x 2 y 2 , x 3 y 3 , x 4 y 4 ). -Sqr4 implements a 4-way parallel squaring. Given a vector (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 ) in F 4 p , it returns (x 2 1 , x 2 2 , x 2 3 , x 2 4 ). -Had implements a Hadamard transform. Given a vector (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 ) in F 4 p , it returns (x 1 + x 2 + x 3 + x 4 , x 1 + x 2 − x 3 − x 4 , x 1 − x 2 + x 3 − x 4 , x 1 − x 2 − x 3 + x 4 ).
B.1 Scalar pseudomultiplication
The Montgomery Ladder for scalar pseudomultiplication on K Sqr is implemented in Algorithm 9, replicating the approach in [39] . It relies on the WRAP and xDBLADD functions, implemented in Algorithm 10 respectively 11. The function WRAP takes a Kummer point ±P in K Sqr (F p ) and returns w 2 , w 3 , and w 4 in F p such that (1 : w 2 : w 3 : w 4 ) = (1/X P 1 : 1/X P 2 : 1/X P 3 : 1/X P 4 ). The resulting values are required in every xDBLADD within Ladder; the idea is to compute them once with a single inversion at the start of the procedure, thus avoiding further expensive inversions. We note that this "wrapped" form of the point ±P was previously used as a compressed form for Kummer point transmission, but since it requires three full field values it is far from an optimal compression. 1 function get_K 2 Input: (l 1 , l 2 , τ ) with l 1 , l 2 ∈ F p and τ ∈ {0, 1} Output: K 2 (l 1 , l 2 , τ ) in F p as in Equation (22) Cost: 1M + 3S + 6C + 4a + 2s 1 function get_K 3 Input: (l 1 , l 2 , τ ) with l 1 , l 2 ∈ F p and τ ∈ {0, 1} Output: K 3 (l 1 , l 2 , τ ) in F p as in Equation (23 1 function get_K 4 Input: (l 1 , l 2 , τ ) with l 1 , l 2 ∈ F p and τ ∈ {0, 1} Output: K 4 (l 1 , l 2 , τ ) in F p as in Equation (24) Cost: 3M + 3S + 6C + 4a + 2s 
